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RECENT CASES
claims have been made. Although the heirs have title, this
has no bearing on whether they are well enough informed
about the affairs of the estate to know that there is occasion
to contest a petition for the sale of land or to appeal an order
for such a sale.
A clear understanding of the function performed by
the administrator leads to the conclusion that his duty to
the heirs is not limited to those subjects to which he has
title. The Supreme Court, by recognizing this, has provided
the basis for overruling some decisions of the Appellate Court
which have emphasized title to the exclusion of the more
realistic considerations which should be the basis for de-
cision.16
EVIDENCE
INSPECTION OF OPPONENT'S CHATTELS
BEFORE TRIAL
An action was brought for damages against a soft-drink
bottling company on account of illness allegedly resulting
from the presence of poisonous foreign matter in the bottle
from which the plaintiff drank. Prior to the trial plaintiff
refused defendant permission to have a chemical analysis
made of the contents of the bottle and the court denied
defendant's motion to require plaintiff to deposit the
bottle with the court so that an analysis could be made.
During the trial plaintiff's attorney stated that he had never
had a chemical analysis made but objected to testifying that
he had refused to permit the defendant to make such an
analysis. Objection sustained, verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina
upheld the order denying defendant's motion but reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial. The evidence excluded
was a circumstance which the jury should have been permitted
to consider. Welsh v. Gibbons, 46 S.E. 2d 147 (S.C. 1948).
That litigants in a modern trial, where the main issue
is whether or not deleterious substances were present in con-
sumer's goods, can carry the case to judgment without sub-
16. Richcreek v. Richereek, 116 Ind. App. 422, 64 N.E.2d 308 (1945).
See also Hetzell v. Morrison, 115 Ind. App. 512, 60 N.E.2d 150(1945), where although the correct result was undoubtedly reached
in view of the other facts of the case, the Appellate Court argued
in terms of title.
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mitting scientific proof of the presence of the foreign matter
must seem utterly fantastic to one untrained in the law. Yet
the South Carolina Court apparently felt it had no alterna-
tive but to deny defendant's motion ordering the bottle to
be brought into court so that an inspection could be made.
This conclusion was based on two grounds: (1) a South Ca-
rolina statute expressly abolished discovery except as pro-
vided therein,' and (2) the court did not have the inherent
power to grant such an order.
There can be little doubt that the relief sought by the
defendant was in the nature of an equitable bill of discovery.
At common law one of the rules of the game was every man
for himself, which meant that evidence and witnesses were
.the secret weapons of the party who had them.2  However
a proceeding developed in chancery whereby the parties could
gain some insight into the nature of their opponent's case3 as
well as to help their own. 4 This proceeding was known as a
bill of discovery and it lay either in equitable suits or in aid
of an action at law where discovery was essential to the
proper determination of the question in dispute.5 As a rule
the only relief granted in those bills was to require written
interrogatories to be answered under oath.6 On occasion
however, the chancellor went further and also ordered the
production and inspection of documents,7 chattels and prem-
ises.8 There are a few isolated cases of inspection itself being
ordered in equity without any mention of discovery 9 which
1. S.C. Code (1942) §674. "No action to obtain discovery under
oath, in aid of the prosecution or defense of another action, shall
be allowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on hehalf
of the adverse party, except in the manner presented by this chap-
ter." The sections which follow authorize the examination of a
party at or before a trial at the instance of the adverse party and
outline the procedure to be followed in obtaining such examination.
This is the only section of the South Carolina Code which has any
relation to discovery with the exception of § 673. The latter sec-
tion provides for inspection of books and documents.
2. 6 Wigmore, "Evidence" §1845 (3rd ed. 1940); 5 Jones, "Evidence"§2040 (2d ed. 1926).
3. This of course only incidentally because of what they discovered
about their own cause of action. 6 Wigmore, "Evidence" §1846.
Cf. 5 Jones, "Evidence" §§2041-2.
4. 6 Wigmore, "Evidence" §§1846, 1856; 5 Jones, "Evidence" §2041.
5. See n. 4 supra.
6. See n. 4 supra.
7. 6 Wigunore, "Evidence" §1857; 5 Jones, "Evidence" §2044.
8. 6 Wigmore, "Evidence" §1862; 5 Jones, "Evidence" §2045.




may have given rise to the argument that inspection was a
separate equitable remedy.0 But in the light of the history
of discovery it probably must be conceded that production
and inspection were both parts of the remedy of discovery
prior to statutory changes. However the common law courts
slowly developed a system of profert and oyer which allowed
a limited inspection of documentary evidence before trial.'
The right to inspection of documents and writings was fin-
ally expressly given to the common law courts in England
by statute in 185112 and in 1854 the right to inspection was
extended to premises and chattels.13 Most of the states today
have statutes allowing inspection of documents and writings.:4
Where the statute does not expressly authorize discovery and
inspection of chattels, the courts have sharply split over the
power of the court to grant such a motion." Today the
formal distinctions between law and equity have been dis-
carded in all but a handful of the states. In the absence
of a statute expressly forbidding discovery of chattels, or
purporting to supercede all prior remedies, it is difficult to
see why a court is without at least the implied power to see
that justice is done by exercising the power of the chan-
cellor.' 6
Whether or not courts have the inherent power, presumably
based on the function of a court to see that justice is done,
to grant an order for inspection presents a very difficult
problem. For if the courts have such a power, enabling stat-
utes are 'surplusage and attempts by the legislature to take
10. Hall v. Joiner, 1 S. C. 186 (1869); Thomas v. Spartanburg Ry.,
107 S. C. 109, 91 S.E. 258 (1917).
11. 6 Wigmore, "Evidence" §§1858-60.
12. 14 & 15 Viet., C.99, §6.
13. 17 & 18 Vict., C. 125, §58.
14. For a collection of citations of the state statutes see 6 Wigmore,
"Evidence" §1859, n. 1 (pp. 454-64).
15. The courts have the power: Skinner v. Judson, 8 Conn. 528
(1831); Coca-Cola Co. v. City of Atlanta, 152 Ga. 558, 110 S.E.
730 (1922); Cleveland R. W. Co. v. Huddleston, 151 Ind. 540, 46
N. E. 678 (1897); Culbertson v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 87 Kan.
529, 125 Pac. 81 (1912); McGuire v. Village of Caledonia, 140
Minn. 151, 167 N. W. 426 (1918); State ex rel. American Mfg.
Co. v. Anderson, 270 Mo. 633, 194 S. W. 268 (1917); Ingram v.
Boston & Maine R. R., 89 N. H. 292, 197 A. 824 (1938). Contra:
Wilson v. Collins, 57 Misc. S63, 109 N. Y. S. 660 (1908) ; O'Reilly
v. Superior Court, 46 R. I. 37, 124 A. 726 (1924); Cargill v.
Kountz, 86 Te. 386, 22 S. W. 1015 (1893); Larson v. Salt Lake
City, 34 Utah 318, 97 P. 483 (1908).
16. See n. 15 supra.
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the power away from the courts would be void.'- This seems
to be a problem that each state must decide for itself. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina has previously decided
that their courts do not have the inherent power to order a
plaintiff in a personal injury suit to submit to a physical
examination.18 From this analogy the court in the principal
case reluctantly concludes they are without inherent power
to grant the defendant's motion for inspection.0
In reversing the present case, the court holds that the
jury might draw an inference against the plaintiff because
of his failure to permit an inspection. Whether the inferenec
will go to the credibility of the plaintiff as a witness or to
the withholding of evidence is not pointed out. At any rate
this should tend to reach the desired result and is in accord
with other states. 20
17. This is true of course only under a separation of powers doctrine
under which the state courts derive their authority from the state
constitutions. See: Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N. E. 556(1886) ; Ratliff v. Stretch, 130 Ind. 282, 30 N. E. 30 (1892) ; Fuller
v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 57 So. 806 (1912) ; State v. Superior Court,
39 Ariz. 242, 5. P 2d 192 (1931).
18. This result which seems well settled in South Carolina now, was
not reached without several strong dissents in earlier years. The
cases are discussed by the court in the principal case at page 149.Other states have come to the opposite conclusion on this point.
Indiana for example, after holding for years that the courts do
not have the power to order physical examination of litigants in
personal injury suits, now holds that the courts do have the
power. The leading case is City of South Bend v. Turner, 156
Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901) which overruled the prior cases. It
is dificult to tell from this decision whether the Indiana court
relies on inherent power or implied power in the absence of stat-
utes since both terms are used in the opinion.
19. Using the same reasoning it would appear that defendant's mo-
tion for inspection in this case would have been granted in In-diana since the Indiana courts allow physical examination in the
absence of a statute, n. 17 supra. The only Indiana statutes on the
subject are Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns 1933) §§2-1644, 2-1645 (pro-duction and inspection of books, papers and documents). See
Cleveland R. W. Co. v. Huddleston, 151 Ind. 540, 46 N. E. 678(1897) (allowing motion to produce a specimen of urine for in-
spection and analysis).
20. Morris v. Buchanan, 220 Ind. 510, 519, 44 N. E. 2d 166 (1942).It is possible to make the argument that if plaintiff is not re-
quired to let the defendant inspect chattels in his conrol it must
be because the plaintiff has a privilege not to do so, and failing
to do that which one had a privilege not to do is not the proper
basis for an inference. 2 Wigmore, "Evidence" §291.
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